周波：美国撤离之际，我国如安在欧洲安全中发挥作用

liukang20242个月前 (05-11)吃瓜始末977

编者按：清华大学国际战略与安全研讨中心研讨员周波22日在《南华早报》宣布谈论《美国撤离之际，我国如安在欧洲安全中发挥效果》（How China could play a role in European security as the US retreats），剖析了乌克兰抵触布景下美国战略缩短对欧洲安全的冲击，探讨了我国在促进停火、维和及刻画欧洲安全格式中的潜在人物。文章指出，面临北约扩张的阻滞与欧洲战略自主的窘境，我国可通过团体安全确保与维和举动，在欧洲安全业务中发挥史无前例的影响力，敞开地缘政治新篇章。本文为北京对话与观察者网翻译发布，以飨读者。

【文/周波，翻译/王凡非】

虽然尘土没有完全落定，笼罩俄乌抵触的迷雾已开端散失。俄罗斯行将完全克复库尔斯克西部区域，并据其本身评价，操控了卢甘斯克简直悉数疆域，以及顿涅茨克、扎波罗热和赫尔松区域超越七成的疆域。

这也解说了为何俄罗斯总统普京并不急于承受停火协议。他意在先争取时间，确保战场上的完全成功，终究才着手处理抵触的本源问题。

乌克兰是无可争议的失利一方。总统泽连斯基，这位旧日的喜剧演员，将以悲惨剧人物的身份载入史册。乌克兰绝不会供认俄罗斯的吞并，被占据的四个区域在未来数十年或许成为俄罗斯的丧命软肋，虽然如此，乌克兰将别无选择，不甘心也只能承受俄罗斯事实上对四个区域的操控。

即使如欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩所提议，乌克兰在2030年前参加欧盟，其参加北约的期望看起来已无完成或许。此外，研讨闪现，680万乌克兰难民中，方案在战后回来家乡的人缺乏对折。

当地时间2月24日，冯德莱恩称乌克兰有望于2030年前参加欧盟。

欧洲同样是失利的一方。其挫折更多源于俄罗斯仍是美国尚无结论。美国副总统万斯在慕尼黑安全会议上对欧洲领导人的尖锐批评，令欧洲深感绝望，决计加大防务投入。这一进程当然苦楚，但欧洲尚有才干担负。即使失掉美国的支撑，其他北约成员国也具有足够资源，足以研制多样化的兵器与作战体系。十年之内，欧洲的安全架构或将产生深化革新。

欧洲真能完成其所标榜的战略自主吗？简而言之，不或许。只需欧盟仍依靠美国的核威慑作为北约的终极屏障，答案只能是否定的。即使英国与法国的核武库加在一起，与俄罗斯比较也无法平衡。

法国总统马克龙许诺为欧洲供给“延伸核威慑”的说法因而令人质疑。终究有多少国家能真实信任法国的确保？据称，前法国总统戴高乐曾质疑美国是否会“为了解救巴黎而献身纽约”，这一疑虑或许才是推进法国展开核武库的真实动力。

欧洲的安全取决于其与俄罗斯共存的才干。俄罗斯的势力范围已大幅萎缩，在欧洲仅剩白俄罗斯为其忠诚盟友。俄罗斯不或许在常规战役中击败由32国组成的北约，也不致于会考虑对北约国家发起先下手为强的核打击，由于这无疑将引起报复。

北约的扩张已近尾声。它或能苟活，却难以昌盛。首要，西方自由民主在全球的阑珊削弱了北约作为其军事支柱的力气。这一趋势在美国总统特朗普的领导下或许加快，他对民主准则漠然置之。

其次，特朗普期望将欧洲安全交给欧洲人，专心于印太区域及与我国的竞赛，这使北约的欧洲化不行避免，因而将加快这一联盟的式微。

乌克兰抵触激发了国际对我国发挥更大全球效果的等待，无论是在战后仍是在万斯慕尼黑讲演之后。我国提出的12点平和方案及与巴西一起推进全球南边国家支撑停火，标明它愿意为完毕战役作出贡献。

外交部相关公告截图

但是，我国的实质性人物或许在停火或休战达到后才干闪现。这取决于两大条件：假如包含我国在内的大国需求供给团体安全确保；假如为避免俄罗斯或乌克兰违背停火需求展开维和举动。

1953年的朝鲜停战协议供给了一个典范，展现了大国支撑的非正式协议能够缓解敌对状态。该协议首要由我国、美国和朝鲜商洽达到，虽然未签署正式平和公约，朝鲜抵触未再演变为上世纪50年代初的剧烈战役。

维和举动需首要取得交兵两边的赞同。若联合国授权，我国作为安理会常任理事国中最大的部队差遣国，能够引领全球南边国家及部分非北约欧洲国家一起举动。俄罗斯将坚决对立任何北约或欧盟成员国的参加。

若这些想象成真，将是我国初次被约请参加刻画欧洲安全格式。颇具挖苦的是，当美国追求转向印太区域之际，我国或将深化欧洲内地。这预示着一个新时代的敞开。

以下为英文采访原文：

Even if the dust has yet to fully settle, the fog shrouding the Ukraine conflict has begun to lift. Russia is on the verge of reclaiming full control over the western reaches of Kursk and, by its own reckoning, holds nearly all of Luhansk and over 70 percent of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.

This explains why Russian President Vladimir Putin is in no rush to embrace a ceasefire. He seeks to bide his time, securing a decisive battlefield victory before turning to address the war’s underlying causes.

Ukraine, however, emerges as the unequivocal loser. President Volodymyr Zelensky, once a comedian, will be etched in history as a tragic figure. Ukraine will never acknowledge Russia’s annexation, and the four occupied regions may yet prove to be Russia’s Achilles’ heel in the decades ahead. Still, Ukraine will have little choice but to grudgingly accept Russia’s de facto control.

Even if Ukraine joins the European Union before 2030, as suggested by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, its aspirations for NATO membership appear doomed. Moreover, studies indicate that fewer than half of the 6.8 million Ukrainian refugees plan to return home once the war concludes.

Europe, too, finds itself among the vanquished, though whether its setbacks stem more from Russia or the United States remains unclear. Following U.S. Vice President Vance’s scathing critique of European leaders at the Munich Security Conference, a disillusioned Europe has resolved to bolster its defense spending. Painful as this may be, it is within Europe’s means. Even without U.S. support, other NATO members possess ample resources to develop a wide array of weapons and combat systems. Within a decade, Europe’s security framework could undergo a profound transformation.

But can Europe ever attain its much-vaunted strategic autonomy? The answer, in short, is no—not while the EU continues to rely on American nuclear deterrence as NATO’s ultimate shield. The combined nuclear arsenals of Britain and France pale in comparison to Russia’s.

This casts doubt on French President Emmanuel Macron’s pledge to extend nuclear deterrence across Europe. How many nations truly place faith in such a guarantee? Former French President Charles de Gaulle reportedly questioned whether the U.S. would “risk New York to save Paris”—a skepticism that likely spurred France’s pursuit of its own nuclear arsenal.

Europe’s security hinges on its capacity to coexist with Russia. Russia’s sphere of influence has contracted to the point where only Belarus remains a steadfast ally in Europe. Russia lacks the capacity to defeat a 32-member NATO in conventional warfare, nor should it contemplate a preemptive nuclear strike on a NATO state, which would surely provoke retaliation.

NATO’s expansion is nearing its end. It may endure, but it will not flourish. First, the global decline of liberal democracy undermines NATO’s strength as its military arm. This erosion is likely to accelerate under U.S. President Donald Trump, who shows little regard for democratic principles.

Second, Trump’s desire to delegate Europe’s security to Europeans while focusing on the Indo-Pacific and competition with China renders NATO’s Europeanization inevitable, further hastening the alliance’s decline.

The Ukraine conflict has fueled expectations for China to assume a greater global role, both in the war’s aftermath and following Vance’s Munich address. China has signaled its willingness to contribute, as evidenced by its 12-point peace proposal and joint efforts with Brazil to rally Global South nations in support of a ceasefire.

China’s substantive role, however, may materialize only after a ceasefire or armistice is secured. This hinges on two conditions: the need for a collective security guarantee involving major powers, including China, and the requirement for peacekeeping to prevent violations of a ceasefire by either Russia or Ukraine.

The 1953 Korean armistice offers a precedent for how an informal agreement backed by great powers can de-escalate hostilities. Negotiated primarily by China, the U.S., and North Korea, the truce has prevented the Korean conflict from reverting to the intense warfare of the early 1950s, despite the absence of a formal peace treaty.

For peacekeeping to proceed, the consent of the warring parties is essential. Should the UN issue a mandate, China—the largest troop contributor among the UN Security Council’s permanent members—could lead the effort, alongside Global South nations and select non-NATO European states. Russia would categorically oppose the involvement of any NATO or EU member.

Should these scenarios unfold, it would mark the first time China is invited to shape Europe’s security landscape. The irony is striking: as the U.S. seeks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific, China may find itself drawn into the European heartland. This heralds the dawn of a new era.

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